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AU-DELA DU CODE CIVIL, MAIS PAR LE CODE
CIVIL*
John H. Tucker, jr. **
Oil and gas were discovered in Northwest Louisiana early in this
century. Development since these early discoveries has been exten-
sive in all parts of the state, including production from the submerged
lands lying offshore from Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. For many
years, oil and gas have been the source of the largest and most profit-
able industry in Louisiana.
Initially the drillers and developers came from other states that
had had oil and gas production sufficiently long to develop not only
the technical and mechanical methods of exploration and exploita-
tion, but also the legal procedures and techniques to establish the
legal basis for the relationships between landowner, driller and ex-
ploiter, and the owner of mineral rights only. The first forms used in
Louisiana for oil and gas leases, and sales of minerals, were largely
reproductions of forms used in these other states. The common law
derived from England prevailed in all of these states, either by origin
or subsequent election.
Louisiana, on the contrary, has always been a civil law jurisdic-
* "Aussi je ne saurais mieux finir que par cette forte devise, inspir6e d'un mot
analogue de Jhering, et autour de laquelle converge, qu'enveloppe ou que d6veloppe,
comme I'on prfre, tout le livre de M. G6ny: Par le Code civil, mais au-deld du Code
civil!
"Je serais de ceux peut-etre qui en eussent volontiers retourn6 les termes: Au-deld
du Code civil, mais par le Code civil! Je reconnais que ce serait manquer un peu de
hardiesse et vouloir conserver une part de fiction. Aussi je n'insiste pas, trop heureux
de me laisser convaincre, pourvu que cela puisse convaincre: ce A quoi nous tenons le
plus c'est A TAu-delA'.
"II sera difficile d~sormais que cet 'Au-delh' ne devienne pas le mot d'ordre de tous
les juristes." (R. Saleilles, Preface to G9NY, MfrHODE-D'INTERPR~rATION ET SOURCES EN
DROIT PRIVA PosrrIF, 1st ed. Paris 1899)
English translation by Jaro Mayda under the auspices of Louisiana State Law
Institute 1963, p. LXXXVI:
"I could not end with better words than those inspired by an analogous phrase of
Jhering, which is the focal point of the whole book of Mr. G~ny: 'Through the Civil
Code; but beyond the Civil Code.'
"Perhaps I would be among those who should gladly reverse the order of things
and say 'Beyond the Civil Code, but through it.' I recognize that this might be some-
what conservative and show the desire to preserve a part of the fiction. I do not insist
on it and I am only too glad to be persuaded that the most important is the 'beyond.'
"It will be difficult hence to prevent this 'beyond' from becoming the password of
all lawmen."
This article is reprinted with permission from XENION, Festsctrift fdr Pan. J.
Zepos (Ch. Katsikalis Verlag, Athens 1973), vol. 2, p. 701.
** Chairman, Louisiana State Law Institute, Member of the Shreveport Bar.
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tion, beginning with the time of its occupation and settlement by
France.
Inevitably, in the rapid and extensive development of the indus-
try, there arose legal problems that required Louisiana solutions be-
cause, ever since Louisiana's first Constitution of 1812, the adoption
of any system of laws by reference has been prohibited.
All of these legal problems relate back finally to two basic, fun-
damental conceptions, namely;
(a) What is the nature of the right created by the sale or reser-
vation of mineral rights, and what are the derivative rights and obli-
gations created thereby?
(b) What is the nature of the oil, gas and mineral lease, and
what are the derivative rights and obligations of the parties thereto?
THE LEGAL INHERITANCE OF LOUISIANA
Before these problems are discussed, it will be necessary to delin-
eate very briefly the legal history of the civil law institutions of Louis-
iana, for otherwise it would be difficult to understand how these
problems were solved.
Louisiana was originally occupied by the French, and then it was
established first as a Charter Colony, then as a Crown Colony of
France. The first charter provided that it should be regulated by the
Coutume de Paris and the Royal Ordinances.
At that time, France derived its laws from two sources: in the
south two-fifths of the country, there was the Roman law derived
from the predominantly Roman origin of its population together with
the tradition of the personality of laws. In the north three-fifths,
largely settled by Germanic tribes, law was unwritten and based on
customs that derived their authority from antiquity, repetition and
general knowledge of their existence. These customs were systema-
tized, reduced to writing and promulgated early in the 16th century;
they were revised late in the same century. Of these customs, there
were about sixty general or regional customs, and some three hundred
local customs with very limited jurisdiction.
In 1769, Spain established its control over Louisiana through
General Don Alexander O'Reilly, pursuant to a treaty by which
France ceded Louisiana to Spain. Whether O'Reilly ever supplanted
French private law with Spanish private law has always been ques-
tioned. Spanish law at the time was contained in a multiplicity of
legal institutions, ranging in point of time from the earliest, Fuero
Juzgo of 693, to the latest, Nueva Recopilacion of 1567, and Auto
Acordados of 1745. None of these institutions had ever been repealed,
and coherence was only partially achieved by means of schedules of
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priorities, enunciated particularly in the Ordenamiento de Alcala,
1348; and in the Leyes de Toro, 1505.
In any event, there was considerable consanguinity between
French law and Spanish law, for both systems were derived from the
same sources, namely, Roman and customary law.
The transfer of Louisiana to French dominion in 1803, to be
followed twenty days later from France to the United States, left
Louisiana in a juridical vacuum. Laussat, the French Colonial Pre-
fect, immediately on taking office, abolished Spanish courts and the
Spanish colonial government, without substituting any legal institu-
tions or governmental organization to replace that which he had de-
stroyed.
Governor William C. C. Claiborne, transferred to New Orleans
from Mississippi to assume the governance of Louisiana, found Louis-
iana in a shambles, with no government, no courts, no laws and no
replacements provided for by the Congress of the United States.
In 1804, however, the Congress of the United States passed an
act erecting the Territory of Louisiana into two jurisdictions, the
Territory of Orleans comprising what is now called Louisiana, lying
south of the southerm boundary of Arkansas, and the balance of the
Louisiana Purchase into the Territory of Louisiana. This act of 1804
gave Louisiana a form of territorial government, and made provision
for legislative and judicial functions.
The population of Louisiana then was predominantly French;
Spanish was indeed a foreign language. Spanish law was contained
in a multiplicity of books, few of which were to be found in Louisiana.
The influx of citizens from the United States, following the Cession
in 1803, generated an attempt to establish the common law in Louis-
iana. In this situation, the indigenous people manifested a desire for
a Civil Code, no doubt prompted by the adoption of the Civil Code
in France, first in parts between 1802 and 1804, and then as a whole
on 21 March 1804.
A Civil Code was authorized by the Legislature in 1806, and was
adopted in 1808. It was originally written in French, and even today
the French text prevails over the English translation.
A recent detailed, meticulous study of the source of each article
of the Code of 1808 made by Professor Rodolfo Batiza of Tulane
University, demonstrates conclusively that a great majority of the
articles of the Code of 1808, literally or well-nigh so, reproduce the
corresponding source articles of the Code Napoleon.'
1. Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: its Actual Sources and Present
Relevance, 46 TULANE L. REV. 4 (1971).
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In 1822, the Legislature of Louisiana ordered a revision of the
Civil Code of 1808. This was brought about by the decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court giving effect to Spanish law where it had
not been supplanted or repealed by the Code of 1808. This revision
was adopted amd promulgated in 1825, and is the basic Civil Code
of Louisiana today, officially designated as the Revised Civil Code of
1870. The 1870 revision was largely editorial in nature intended only
to give effect to legislative changes made since 1825 and to eliminate
all articles on slavery. The Civil Code of 1825 was preceded by a
projet, republished by the state in 1937. This projet often cites the
source of new articles and reasons for changes made in articles of the
Code of 1808. The republication volume also contains the 1823 report
to the Legislature made by the three redactors of the Code, explaining
the methods they planned to employ, the sources they would consult
and the underlying philosophy they would follow in preparing the
Civil Code.
The primary sources establish clearly the undergirding of the
Civil Code of 1825 with the French Civil Code and French doctrine,
and Roman law and its exponents. This is particularly so, in that part
of the Code involved in this study, namely, Book II, Title II, of Own-
ership; Title III of Usufruct, Use and Habitation; and Title IV of
Predial Servitudes or Servitudes of Land. In fact, such great reliance
was placed on the authority of Toullier that parts of his commentary
were converted into articles of our Civil Code, either literally or by
paraphrase. A similar use was made of Maleville's "Analyse Raison-
n~e" as well as Pothier's treatises and occasionally the Digest of
Justinian.
This r6sum6 of the history of the Louisiana Civil Code has been
necessary to justify the extensive use that must be made of French
sources and French doctrine in discussing the development of the
solutions to those two problems basic to the mineral law of Louisiana.
These problems are grounded deeply in the fundamental philosophy
of the Code Napoleon, which must be consulted if their solution is to
be consistent, coherent and understandable.
It must be noted that for nearly the first century of its existence
Louisiana had only two branches of the legal profession - lawyers.
and judges. It did not have formal law schools, with full-time facul-
ties, fine libraries and law reviews. It did not have its own doctrine
- that is to say, the written, objective discussion of legal history,
philosophy and logical interpretation - that has been the very life
of the civil law. For that purpose, resort had to be made to French
treatises, for French doctrine has assisted greatly in the development
of Louisiana civil law.
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THE MINERAL SERVITUDE
Our mineral law has been developed jurisprudentially, but since
it involves some of the fundamental expressions of the very spirit of
the Louisiana Civil Code, some incursion into French doctrine must
be made to see if the results of that jurisprudence ring true metal.
In France prior to the Revolution there had developed a system
of feudal tenures and practices that were very restrictive of the free-
dom of ownership and the freedom to contract. One of the first fruits
of the French Revolution was the abolition of feudalism on the night
of August 4, 1789. This spirit of freedom was carried over into the
legislation of the Revolution and animates the French Civil Code.
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Chauveau discuss this in their Trait
de Droit Civil, and explain:
In prohibiting the establishment of servitudes which are imposed
upon a person or which profited a person, the redactors of the
Civil Code wished once more to confirm the abolition of feudal-
ism. Under the feudal regime, the possessor of an estate owned
certain services solely because he was the possessor of the estate,
he owed them to the possessor of another estate because the latter
estate was above his in the feudal hierarchy. Thus it is notable
that the possessor of a fief owed to his feudal lord the duty of
military service and the services of court, and of counsel and also
those extraordinary contributions which one calls feudal aids.
Still more it is thus that the possessor of a manor was bound
towards the lord of the manor for the payment of quit-rent, that
is to say a pecuniary and periodical payment. The first owed
personal services or extraordinary subsidies by reason of the pos-
session of the fief and the second owed the quit-rent by reason of
the possession of the manor. The legislator wished to prevent the
revival of the feudal regime by stipulating for services of this
kind. Such is the explanation moreover given by the Tribune
Gillet at the time it was discussed in the Corps Legislatif: 'Today
since these three kinds of rights (usufruct, use and habitation) are
found properly treated in our Civil Code as attributes of property,
one can no longer have mixed or personal servitudes of which
feudal institutions furnished the model; and it is for this reason
that care has been taken to suppress the way by which they can
be revived.' It is then the same preoccupation which has inspired
the dispositions of articles 638 and 686. Article 638 strikes the
landed hierarchy which formed the basis for feudalism and article
686 the personal services which were due because of this hier-
archy.'
2. 6 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE AND CHAUVEAU, TRAIT9 DE DROIT CIVIL, no. 1078 (Paris
3d ed. 1907). (Translation by the author).
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It is to be noted with respect to the last two sentences above that
the Louisiana Civil Code article 709 reproduces precisely article 686
of the Code Napoleon. The Code of 1808 reproduced article 638,
which "strikes the landed hierarchy which formed the basis for feu-
dalism," but it was deleted when the Code of 1825 was prepared with
this explanation in the Projet:
We have thought it best to suppress this article which prescribed
that servitudes did not establish any right of pre-eminence of one
estate over another, as it is copied from the Code Napoleon, and
was adopted in France only for the purpose of preventing, that
under the title of servitude, feudal rights should be established,
which had been abolished. It is utterly useless among us.
This deletion, of course, recognizing that feudal rights had no exist-
ence in Louisiana, emphasizes the intention in Louisiana to achieve
simplicity and complete freedom of ownership by the adoption of the
provisions of the Code Napoleon designed to establish this basic phi-
losophy.
The objective of establishing simplicity and complete freedom of
ownership and complete freedom of contract was built into the foun-
dation of the Code Napoleon and adopted well-nigh literally into the
Louisiana Civil Code. The principal provisions of this codal structure
are the following:
Louisiana Civil Code Article 484 (C.N. Art. 537) says that indi-
viduals have the free disposal of their property under restrictions
established by law.
Art. 488 "Ownership is the right by which a thing belongs to
someone in particular, to the exclusion of all other persons." This was
taken from Pothier's Trait6 du Droit du Domaine de ProprietY, no.
4, but it is not found in the Code Napoleon.
Art. 487 (C.N. Art. 543) says that one may have over things
either (a) a right of ownership (b) a right of use of enjoyment or (c) a
right of servitude on an immovable.
Art. 491 (C.N. Art. 544) says that "perfect ownership gives the
right to use, to enjoy and to dispose of one's property in the most
unlimited manner, provided it is not used in any way prohibited by
laws or ordinances." The English texts of the Codes of 1808 and 1825
use the term "absolute ownership," while the French texts use "la
pleine proprit." The Code Napoleon simply uses "la proprikt."
The French text of Article 482 (par. 2) of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825 reads: "Une propri~t6 est pleine et parfaite, lorsqu'elle
est perpetuelie, et que la chose n'est charg~e d'aucun droit reel envers
d'autres personnes que le propri~taire." This is imperfectly trans-
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lated in the English text of that article which now appears as Article
490 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870.
Freedom of contract is provided by Article 1901 (C.N. Art. 1134)
which reads:
Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws on those
who formed them.
They cannot be revoked unless by mutual consent of the parties,
or for causes acknowledged by law.
They must be performed with good faith.
The provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code further extend this
freedom 'of contract and of ownership in the articles relating to real
obligations.
Art. 1997 says that an obligation "is real when it is attached to
immovable property, and passes with it into whatever hands it may
come, without making the third possessor personally responsible."
Art. 2012 relates how real obligations may be created, and says,
in effect, that servitudes, and rights of usufruct, use and habitation
may be created "by alienating to one person the immovable property,
and to another, some real right to be exercised upon it."
Art. 2011 provides: "Not only the obligation, but the right result-
ing from a contract relative to immovable property, passes with the
property. Thus the right of servitude in favor of immovable property,
passes with it . .. ."
Art. 2013 provides that the real obligation, created by condition
annexed by the alienation of the real property, is susceptible of all
the modifications that the will of the parties can suggest, except such
as are forbidden by law.
Considering the plenary authority given by the quoted articles of
the Louisiana Civil Code, there never has been, nor does it appear
that there could be, any doubt about the right of the owner of land,
to sell the mineral rights thereto, or to reserve the mineral rights for
himself in a sale of the land to another. His own right to explore for
and produce minerals, including oil and gas, from his own property
is accorded to him by Article 505 (C.N. Art. 552), which in pertinent
part says:
The ownership of the soil carries with it the ownership of all that
is directly above and under it . . ..
He may construct below the soil all manner of works, digging as
deep as he deems convenient, and draw from them all the bene-
fits which may accrue, under such modifications as may result
from the law and regulations concerning mines and the laws and
regulations of the police.
19741
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The early cases involving the question of the nature of mineral
rights in Louisiana were debated by proponents of the theory that
there can be a "mineral estate" in Louisiana, that is, a corporeal
entity separate and apart from and wholly independent of the surface
of the soil under which the minerals lie. The opponents of this theory
claimed that the "mineral estate" is only an incorporeal right, or
charge upon the land, in effect, a servitude.
Two early cases, DeMoss v. Sample3 and Calhoun v. Ardis4
tended to support the theory that the owner of lands had the right to
dismember the property and vest the ownership of the surface of the
soil in one person and that of the minerals in another person, or retain
it himself.
However, three years later, in what is considered generally to be
a landmark case in the mineral law of Louisiana, styled Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Saling's Heirs,5 the Supreme Court rejected
the notion of a mineral estate, separate and apart from the land and
subject to full ownership as a specific thing apart from the soil of
which it forms a part. On the contrary, it held, in effect, that the
reservation of minerals gave only the right to explore for and produce
oil and gas, if found; that this right was a real right in the nature of
a servitude, to which the ten-year prescription of non-usage under
Article 789 (C.N. Art. 706) would apply. The decision in Frost-
Johnson, particularly, is generally considered to have reached a salu-
tary conclusion, for the requirement that the owner of a mineral
servitude must use his right or suffer the penalty of having it extin-
guished for non-usage is sound public policy. However, there was a
multiplicity of judicial opinions, prevailing, concurring, and dissent-
ing, on original hearing and on rehearing.
There is considerable discussion about the nature of the mineral
servitude. Is it a personal servitude, or is it a predial or landed servi-
tude? This semantical discussion has plagued our jurisprudence, but
the common denominator of all our mineral right cases is this: The
sale or reservation of mineral rights by the owner of the land affected,
creates a real right in the nature of a predial servitude, the rules of
which will be applied to this right insofar as applicable and appropri-
ate.
This semantical debate arises out of a superficial consideration
of Louisiana Civil Code Article 646 which reads:
3. 143 La. 243, 248, 78 So. 483, 484 (1918).
4. 144 La. 311, 314, 80 So. 548, 549 (1919).
5. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
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All servitudes which affect lands may be divided into two kinds,
personal and real.
Personal servitudes are those attached to the person for whose
benefit they are established, and terminate with his life. This
kind of servitude is of three sorts: usufruct, use and habitation.
Real servitudes, which are also called predial or landed
servitudes, are those which the owner of an estate enjoys on a
neighboring estate for the benefit of his own estate.
They are called predial or landed servitudes, because, being es-
tablished for the benefit of an estate, they are rather due to the
estate than to the owner personally.
This kind of servitude forms the subject of the present title.
The Projet of the Code of 1825 (p. 68) says that the sources of
this article are: Digest, book 8, tit. 1, law 1; and Pothier, Coutume
d'Orlans, Introduction to tit. 13, of servitudes, Art. 1, No. 2. It has
no corresponding article in the Code Napoleon, but that does not
indicate any significant change in substance between the two codes.
Art. 655 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides: "One of the char-
acteristics of a servitude is, that it does not oblige the owner of the
estate subject to it to do anything, but to abstain from doing a par-
ticular thing, or to permit a certain thing to be done to his estate."
The source of this article (Projet p. 70) is Digest, book 8, tit. 2, law
39. There is no corresponding article in the Code Napoleon.
Justice Provosty, in his separate opinion on rehearing in
Louisiana and A. Ry. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co.,' discussing Arti-
cles 648 and 655, said:
Under Roman Law, a servitude by which the owner of the ser-
vient estate should be required to do something was unknown.
From its very nature,said Pomponius, a servitude does not re-
quire that one shall do anything, but merely that he shall abstain
from doing something, or shall suffer something to be done.
Servitutum non ea natura est ut aliquid fqciat quis, sed ut aliquid
patiatur aut non faciat. DeFresquet, Trait6 de Droit Romain,
Vol. 1. p. 290.
Later on, Judge Provosty says:
The Roman Law recognized usufruct, use and habitation as per-
sonal servitudes, which, in fact they are, and therefore divided
servitudes into personal and real, the personal being due to a
person, and the real those due to an estate; and we, in our Article
6. 131 La. 288, 59 So. 403 (1912). Judge Provosty's separate opinion was not
attached to the official report of that case 59 So. 411.
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646, have adopted the same classification. Real conventional ser-
vitudes varied in kind, according to the necessity for establishing
them; and so we, in our Article 646, have contented ourselves
with describing real servitudes in general terms, without at-
tempting to name or enumerate their different kinds. Personal
servitudes, on the other hand, were limited and restricted, under
the Roman law, to usufruct, use and habitation, and terminate
with the life of the beneficiary. And so we, in our article 646 have
similarly dealt with them:
'Personal servitudes,' declares the article, 'are those attached to
the person for whose benefit they are established, and terminate
with his life. This kind of servitude is of three sorts: Usufruct, use,
and habitation.
In describing the nature of a servitude, our Code, Article 655, uses
the very words of Pomponius, quoted above. Thus: 'One of the
characteristics of a servitude is that it does not oblige the owner
of the estate subject to it to do anything, but to abstain from
doing a particular thing, or to permit a certain thing to be done
on his estate.'
Article 709 of the Louisiana Civil Code is broad authority for the
establishment of conventional servitudes. It reads:
Owners have a right to establish on their estates, or in favor of
their estates, such servitudes as they deem proper; provided, nev-
ertheless, that the services be not imposed on the person or in
favor of the person, but only on an estate or in favor of an estate;
and provided, moreover, that such services imply nothing con-
trary to public order.
The use and extent of servitudes thus established are regu-
lated by the title by which they are granted, and if there be no
titles, by the following rules.
This is almost an exact translation of the French text of Article 686
of the Code Napoleon.
As in the definition of a predial servitude, this article literally
would limit the creation of predial servitudes to servitudes imposed
on one estate in favor of another estate. But this restrictive language
must be interpreted with the other articles of the code establishing
the most extensive contractual freedom in the creation of real rights.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has given a logical and teleolog-
ical interpretation to these articles, as exemplified by the opinion in
Frost-Johnson, and as discussed by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos of
Louisiana State University in his treatise "Civil Law of Property".
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He says that in Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux,7 the Supreme
Court of Louisiana "adopted the view that, in principle, the parties
to a contract may create real rights 'apart and beyond' those created
in the Civil Code, subject to a close judicial scrutiny in the general
interest of the public."8
In the Frost-Johnson case it was held:
In the matter of burdening his lands with some real obligation in
favor of a person and his heirs, there is not the least doubt that
the owner can do so unless some positive law prohibits it. Now
the right to establish a servitude in favor of a person and his heirs
seems to be forbidden by C.C. arts. 646, 709. But, on the other
hand, it seems to be allowed by C.C. arts. 607, 758, 2013. And
with these conflicting provisions before us we cannot say that the
law clearly prohibits the creation of a servitude upon lands in
favor of a person and his heirs. And hence the intention of the
parties should govern in such matters.9
In some cases, the mineral servitude has been called a "personal
servitude in the nature of a limited usufruct," particularly in Palmer
Corp. v. Moore.'" But in that case it was purely obiter dictum, and
was repudiated as such in the Per Curiam on rehearing. It was re-
jected also in Sample v. Whitaker," and later cases have returned to
the earlier definition of "a real right in the nature of a servitude."
In Keebler v. Seubert,I2 the Supreme Court of Louisiana held
that the right to explore and exploit the property of another is the
very essence of the mineral servitude, and is not accessory to the right
to reduce to possession minerals found as a result of the exploration.
Accordingly, it held that good faith exploration constituted usage of
the servitude even when unsuccessful.
While the Supreme Court has not been consistent in the past in
terminology used in referring to this real right, general usage now
seems to prefer to designate it as a "mineral servitude", and seman-
tics may ultimately sanction the designation.
Nevertheless, the court has consistently and logically applied
articles of the Civil Code relating to predial servitudes to mineral
rights questions, and has refused to apply those relating to personal
servitudes (usufruct). Thus, in the cornerstone case (Frost-Johnson)
7. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
8. A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY §101 (1966).
9. 150 La. 756, 863, 91 So. 207, 245 (1922).
10. 171 La. 774, 782, 132 So. 229, 231 (1931).
11. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
12. 167 La. 901, 120 So. 591 (1929).
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upon which the structure of Louisiana mineral law has been erected,
the court, having decided that the sale or reservation of mineral rights
constituted a real right in the nature of servitude, and having to
determine whether this real right of servitude could be established in
favor of a person and his heirs, chose against application of those
Civil Code articles applying to personal servitudes (according to
which the right of personal servitudes expires with the owner) and
applied the predial servitude articles which establish their perma-
nency and heritability.
One of the essential characteristics of a personal servitude is its
divisibility as stated in Civil Code Article 538. The court refused to
apply that article in Sample v. Whitaker, and peremptorily refused
to apply the personal servitude articles in Ford v. Williams.,3 On the
other hand, the court has attributed to mineral rights in Louisiana,
the essential characteristics of a real or predial servitude. It was held
in Sample v. Whitaker and many other cases that the right is indivisi-
ble; in Frost-Johnson and Ford v. Williams and other cases, that it
is permanent and heritable. Accordingly, the court has applied the
prescription of ten years for non-use under Civil Code Article 789; and
the doctrine of interruption of that prescription by the minority or use
by a co-owner under Civil Code Articles 801 and 802. All these articles
relate to real servitudes.
Conservation laws establishing well spacing regulations and
drilling units, and frequently necessitating unitization of drilling in-
terests, have created problems not possible of solution by deduction
and analogy from these basic principles of the Civil Code.
Well established public policy in Louisiana favors the strict ap-
plication of the prescription of the mineral servitude by non-usage
during ten years. This has caused the enactment of legislation insu-
lating the servitude from the effect of Code articles that otherwise
would have provided grounds for the interruption of the prescription.
However, ever since Frost-Johnson, Louisiana jurisprudence has
adhered to the philosophy that the sale or reservation of mineral
rights creates a real right in the nature of a servitude, now generally
called a "mineral servitude." This is concisely and clearly stated in
Wemple v. Nabors Oil and Gas Company.'4 Notwithstanding the
obfuscations of illogical semantical discussions, the jurisprudence
respecting mineral rights has been developed by the consistent and
analogical application of the basic rules relating to predial or landed
servitudes.
13. 189 La. 229, 179 So. 298 (1938).
14. 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923).
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THE MINERAL LEASE
In the usual oil and gas, or mineral lease, the mineral owners for
a cash consideration called "bonus" give the lessee the exclusive right
to explore and exploit the property for oil, gas and other minerals
and, if successful, to reduce them to possession, giving the mineral
lessors a fixed proportion thereof as royalty. Usually, the lease re-
quires actual drilling operations to begin within one year, but drilling
may be postponed from year to year, for the term of the lease, by
paying annually a fixed sum as delay rental. The lease is effective as
long as there is production therefrom or active drilling operations are
being conducted even beyond the primary term.
In one of the earliest cases, Spence v. Lucas,'" the court was
called upon to decide whether a mineral contract on a royalty basis
was a sale or lease. The Court said:
Until the Legislature shall have passed laws especially applicable
to the industry of mining, which is a new one in this state, the
parties engaged in those pursuits, and the courts of the state will
adhere to the jurisprudence on the subject, and treat mineral
contracts as leases.
Nearly ten years later, in Logan v. State Gravel Co.,'" the court
said:
This expression has stood on the books for nearly 10 years and
since then the Legislature has met seven times without making
any change in the law, in that respect, although the industry has
greatly developed since then and many laws have been passed on
the subject thereof. We conclude that the Legislature is satisfied
with the law of the case last cited and hence we now reaffirm the
principle therein announced . ...
But there are two ways in which that incorporeal right (mineral
servitude) may be dealt with, viz: (1) It may be sold outright, as
may a "servitude" or any other incorporeal thing. (R.C.C. Art.
2449); or (2) The land may be leased for mining purposes for a
fixed rental, or on a royalty basis (R.C.C. Art. 2671).
The conclusion was that land adapted for mining or quarrying
may be leased for a certain portion of such mine or produce from such
land and the fact that this portion is called "royalty" instead of rent
is inconsequential, for rent by whatever name is a profit in money,
or a certain quantity of commodities, or even a portion of the fruits
15. 138 La. 763, 70 So. 796 (1916).
16. 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925).
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yielded by the thing leased. That, of course, is analogically justified
by the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2464. The price of the sale must be certain, that is to say,
fixed and determined by the parties.
It ought to consist of a sum of money, otherwise it would be
considered as an exchange ....
Art. 2671 (under Book III, Title IX, of Lease). The price should
be certain and determinate, and should consist of money. How-
ever, it may consist in a certain quantity of commodities, or even
a portion of the fruits yielded by the thing leased.
Very much later, this observation about the inaction of the
Legislature was reiterated in Tyson v. Surf Oil Co.," with the added
observation that the Legislature had refused to adopt the proposed
mineral code of 1938, from which a sort of tacit approval of past
jurisprudence was presumed.
The essential right conferred by a mineral lease is, as in the case
of the mineral servitude, likewise one of exploration and exploitation
with the obligation of the lessee to pay rent in the form of royalty, if
minerals are found in paying quantities. This royalty is rent, for the
payment of which the lessor was given the lessor's pledge and privi-
lege under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2705' and to which the pre-
scription of three years for the arrearages of rent is applicable.'9
There are some cases that refer to mineral leases as servitudes
and in the early case of Spence v. Lucas, it was said that they partake
of the nature of both sale and lease. But just as the mineral servitude
cannot fit precisely into the codal definition of a predial servitude,
so the mineral lease does not coincide exactly with the codal specifi-
cations of a lease. The confusion of terminology is understandable
when it is realized that the essential rights of exploration and exploi-
tation, and reduction to possession, if successful, are exactly the same
as conferred by the mineral servitude or the mineral lease. Therefore,
it would seem that it matters little how we designate or label the
mineral lease, the determining factor for the application of the appro-
priate provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code should be the tests
implied in Logan v. State Gravel Co..2°
Nevertheless, any panoramic view of the mineral jurisprudence
17. 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
18. Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925).
19. LoUIsIANA CIV. CODE, art. 3538; Board of Comm'rs. v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La.
301, 120 So. 373 (1928).
20. See, also the discussion of the controversial jurisprudence and legislation in A.
YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY §100 (1966).
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of this state gives a very strong impression that mineral leases have
always created real rights, in spite of two paroxysmal decisions in
Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell,2' and Tyson v. Surf Oil Co.,2 the adjec-
tival effects of which were quickly cured by appropriate legislation.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2725 (C.N. 1717) gives the lessee
"the right to underlease, or even to cede his lease to another person,
unless this power has been expressly interdicted. The interdiction
may be for the whole, or for a part; and this clause is always construed
strictly."
The sublease of part of a lease by the lessee and development by
the sublessee was held to enure to the benefit of the entire lease in
Smith v. Sun Oil Co.2 3 In that case, there was an encyclopedic presen-
tation of French doctrine, to the effect that in an assigment of a lease
the lessee transfers his entire interest, in effect he makes a sale, while
in a sublease, the lessee super-poses a new lease upon the primitive
lease, and becomes the sublessor of the sublessee. This philosophy
was adopted by the Supreme Court, and reaffirmed in Johnson v.
Moody2 and Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co.25
It was held in Roberson that the retention of an overriding roy-
alty (in addition to the royalty due the primitive lessor, the sublessee
was required to pay the primitive lessee-sublessor an additional or
overriding royalty) made the transfer a sublease; the price or rent was
the same kind in both lease and sublease, a certain quartity of com-
modities or a portion of the fruits yielded by the thing leased.
The decisions of a United States Court of Appeals in some fed-
eral income tax cases involving the transfer of oil and gas leases" are
in direct conflict with this Louisiana jurisprudence because they
failed to follow the doctrine of the United States Supreme Court that
common law regards a lease for years at a certain rent as the grant
of an estate for years, in which the lessee takes title; the estate of the
lessor during the term of the lease being called the reversion.2? On the
other hand, the civil law regards a lease for years as a mere transfer
for the use and enjoyment of the property. Professor Yiannopoulos
says:
The mineral lease, therefore, should necessarily be classified as
21. 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
22. 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
23. 165 La. 907, 116 So. 379 (1928).
24. 168 La. 799, 123 So. 330 (1929).
25. 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46 (1931).
26. Waller v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1930); Palmer v. Bender, 57
F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1932).
27. Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U.S. 707 (1887).
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a hybrid contract governed in part by the Code provisions on
lease, sale, or servitudes, and in part by special legislation and
rules of judge-made law.2
This indicates the necessity for a critical evaluation and restate-
ment of the law relating to oil and gas or mineral leases. It is agreed
that, as classified by the courts and the legislature, we have a hybrid
contract, but it is to be doubted that the codal provisions on sale or
servitude have had nearly the effect that has resulted from applying
the provisions relating to lease.
ROYALTY RIGHTS
"Royalty" according to Professor Yiannopoulos "is a polyseman-
tic word which in the framework of concrete legal relationships may
designate rights of variable content." Two basic concepts are "rent
royalty" (or sometimes "lease royalty") and "mineral royalty."2'
By rent royalty is meant the consideration out of production paid
by the lessee to the lessor. Mineral royalty, according to Professor
Yiannopoulos, evolved as a distinct right to a portion of the minerals
actually produced or their proceeds. It does not constitute a part of
the consideration due by the lessee under a specific lease. 0
Professor Yiannopoulos discussed this mineral royalty, as thus
far developed, with considerable skepticism. He thinks the right has
not yet been fully developed, and that there is still room for specula-
tion as to some specific characteristics of the new right. He thinks it
is a sui generis real right according to present jurisprudence:
It differs from the traditional real rights in that, in the last analy-
sis, it is not a right in corporeal property but a charge on an
incorporeal immovable attached to land-the mineral right. It is
a real right in the sense that it is an exclusive patrimonial right
which, if recorded, may be asserted during its lifetime against the
world.3
This mineral royalty is the creation of jurisprudence, but, while
it may appear illogical and intrusive into the scheme of ownership of
the Louisiana Civil Code, it apparently has given a measure of satis-
faction to the oil and gas fraternity. Suffice it to say, therefore, that
it should be the objective of any restatement or codification of the
mineral law of Louisiana to accommodate this mineral royalty to a
28. A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY §101 (1966).
29. Id. § 102.
30. Gulf Refining Co. v. Hunter Co., 231 La. 1002, 93 So. 2d 575 (1957).
31. A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY §102 (1966).
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sound, analytical and logical status in the hierarchy of mineral rights
in Louisiana, and consistent with the basic principles of the Civil
Code, if that be possible.
CONCLUSION
The development of the basic mineral law of Louisiana through
the Civil Code to reach results beyond the letter of the Civil Code
represents, probably, the most extended analogical adaptation of the
civil law to modern circumstances. What has been achieved in the
courts of Louisiana erupted out of the spirit of the Code Napoleon -
simplicity of tenures, unfettered freedom of ownership and complete
freedom of contract. That spirit overwhelms when the strict letter of
some particular article would not permit. The Louisiana conception
of the mineral servitude and mineral lease, the foundations of the
most important industry in the state, growing out of the Civil Law,
has served the state well.
Difficulties have been encountered when principles and motifs
have been ignored to indulge in semantical argument. Even then,
when the law is stated in general terms and the motifs therefor under-
stood, it seems that there is a reflex action of the Code itself that
operates to guide the judge or lawyer to the proper interpretation.
These basic concepts that support the mineral law of Louisiana
were generated out of the Civil Code and established and developed
by jurisprudence. The mass of this jurisprudence has increased in
direct proportion with the great expansion of the industry resulting
from the vast improvement in the technology by which it is con-
ducted. There has also been felt the impact of the administrative laws
established to regulate the industry that have been made necessary
by considerations of public policy.
It is often difficult to discern the implications of these fundamen-
tal concepts through this jurisprudential complexity. While the re-
sults reached have been generally correct and consistently main-
tained and developed, there have been few statements of the princi-
ples of mineral law in the jurisprudence that have the clarity and
conciseness of the Civil Code. There has been little discussion of the
philosophy underlying the juridical results reached by the
jurisprudence. It is always difficult to maintain clarity, consistency
and coherence when interpretation is achieved by jurisprudence




The pressure of these circumstances has caused the legal profes-
sion and the oil and gas industry in Louisiana to consider that it was
now appropriate and necessary to undertake an analytical, logical
and complete study of this mineral law, in order to restate it in form
and content in the tradition of the Civil Law of Louisiana.
This study and work of restatement of Louisiana mineral law was
undertaken some time ago by the Louisiana State Law Institute, the
official law revision, law reform and legal research agency of the state.
The processes of the Institute require the work of research and prepa-
ration to be made by a reporter, almost invariably a member of the
faculty of one of the state's law schools, assisted by advisors from the
profession who are specialists in the subject. These people prepare an
avant projet for discussion by the Council of the Institute composed
of lawyers, judges and professors. The projet, as finally adopted by
the Council and corrected by the Semantics Committee for style and
form, is now being submitted to the Legislature.
It is certain that we should not cast off our moorings to the Civil
Code, so firmly bound to the principles of simplicity and complete
freedom of ownership and of contract. That does not mean, however,
that we should amend the Civil Code to accommodate the results
achieved by the restatement and revision by interpolation. It may be
that the desired results could be achieved by including the principles
of our mineral law in a separate mineral code - as France found it
expedient to do with "mines et eaux" in the law of 21 April 1810
(Mines, Mini~res, et Carri~res).
Whether interpolated in the Civil Code or comprised in a sepa-
rate mineral code, it is equally certain that the restatement should
not be in the form of a statute that chokes logical and analogical
interpretation by detail and definition, but should be a statement of
general principles which can be adaptable to specific instances and
expandable by analogy to unforseen circumstances.
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